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INTRODUCTION
Law students traditionally learn the law from reading cases. In some
instances, the cases establish a well-reasoned principle of law. In others,
law students are asked to read cases in which a court gave a contrary
opinion or more simply got the wrong answer. I believe that one such case
(now almost twenty years old, but apparently headed for immortality) is of
the latter variety. The court simply got the wrong answer, and law students
and lawyers should know that.
In Antoniu v. SEC,' the Eighth Circuit found that Charles C. Cox, then a
member of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
Commission), had "impermissibly tainted" an SEC administrative
* Edward T. Breathitt Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. At
the time of the events in Antoniu v. SEC, I was counsel to Commissioner Charles C. Cox
and wrote the first draft of the now infamous speech that is the subject of the court's
opinion. I have reviewed this Essay with Mr. Cox, but the narrative and opinions expressed
herein are mine alone.
1. 877 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1989).
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proceeding against Antoniu by a speech Cox gave while the proceeding
was pending. In this way, Commissioner Cox is now joined with former
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairman Paul Rand Dixon of Texaco,
Inc. v. FTC2 and Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC3 fame
as an administrative law casebook poster child for "prejudgment" by an
administrative agency.
Because this case is seemingly destined for fame (or infamy) in the
casebooks,4 I believe it is important for readers of the case to know that the
truth is very different than the story told therein. Although the court may
have recited proper general principles of law, the court's application of
those principles to the facts at hand is demonstrably incorrect.
The court's decision in Antoniu v. SEC is wrong in two major ways.
First, Commissioner Cox said and did nothing to violate the well-settled
prejudgment doctrine about which the court writes. Second, in an
abundance of caution, he did in fact recuse himself from the proceedings
after his speech, except to participate in a routine denial of an offer of
settlement (with which the court found nothing wrong). I believe the
court's opinion is out of touch with the realities of the administrative
process at the SEC and, I suspect, at many or most other agencies as well.
After a brief discussion of the factual background of the case, I will
demonstrate first that Cox's speech was well on the permissible side of the
prejudgment line. Second, I will discuss participation by agency members
in settlement offers in administrative proceedings. These offers have the
potential for abuse, but modem law suggests that this potential is rarely, if
ever, realized. I will show that there was no impropriety in this case.
Finally, I will discuss the realities of agency action by delegated authority
and how such an otherwise reasonable process makes it difficult for the
agency to distance itself from action appropriately taken by its delegates.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
There were two administrative proceedings in question, labeled by the
Eighth Circuit as Antoniu 16 and Antoniu 11.7 The first proceeding arose
2. 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
3. 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
4. E.g., JOHN M. ROGERS, MICHAEL P. HEALY & RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 154 (2d ed. 2008).
5. Most of the facts are stated in the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC or
Commission) Proffer of Evidence in Support of the Commission's Opposition to
Application for Attorney's Fees, Antoniu v. SEC, 877 F.2d 721 (8th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter
Proffer of Evidence] (on file with author). For a summary of this attorney's fees motion
filed by Antoniu under the Equal Access to Justice Act, see Paul Gonson, Selected Judicial
Developments, in THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1993, at 376, 376-77 (1993).
6. Notice by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 34-22383 (Antoniu 1), 33 SEC Docket 1318 (Sept. 3, 1985).
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from Antoniu's criminal conviction in one of the early "misappropriation"
insider trading cases. 8 Such a criminal conviction results in a statutory bar
from further participation in the securities brokerage industry. 9
Notwithstanding that bar, the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) sought to allow Antoniu to become associated with an NASD-
member registered broker-dealer firm. The NASD was required to file
notice of that action with the SEC, 0 and the SEC was empowered to
review that application." The Commission did so and overturned the
NASD's proposed approval for Antoniu's association with the firm in
question. In the second proceeding, 2 the SEC exercised its statutory
authority 3 to institute administrative proceedings to determine whether
Antoniu should be subject to a permanent bar from association with any
registered broker-dealer.
Thereafter, Commissioner Cox was asked to give a speech at a regional
enforcement conference.' 4 He decided to use the occasion to clarify to the
securities industry and securities bar that, in his opinion, the Commission
should be tougher on those who violate the securities laws and who
believed that some slight time-out should be a sufficient penance.
Commissioner Cox referred to the egregious violation of Antoniu and the
indifference the NASD had shown (in his opinion) to the severity of
Antoniu's violations.
II. THE COURT'S CONFUSION ABOUT THE Two PROCEEDINGS
The court cited Commissioner Cox's statement from his speech that
Antoniu's "bar fr-om association with a broker-dealer was made
permanent' 5 as evidence of prejudgment of Antoniu II, the second
7. Antoniu, Exchange Act Release No. 34-22487 (Antoniu I1), 34 SEC Docket 244
(Sept. 30, 1985).
8. See Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Philip Frese, The Genesis of an Ethical Imperative:
The SEC in Transition, 25 GONZ. L. REV. 9, 38 (1989-1990) ("The misappropriation
theory... had its judicial origin in a 1980 case filed against Adrian Antoniu .... ").
9. For the details of how this works, see § 3(a)(39) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(39)(F) (2000) (defining a "statutory disqualification" by reference
to Securities Exchange Act § 15(b)(4)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(D), based on Antoniu's
criminal conviction).
10. Securities Exchange Act § 15A(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(g)(2).
11. Securities Exchange Act Rule 19h-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19h-l(g) (2008).
12. Antoniu 11, 34 SEC Docket 244 (Sept. 30, 1985).
13. Securities Exchange Act §§ 15(b)(6), 19(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(6), 78s(h).
14. Charles C. Cox, Comm'r, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Making the Punishment Fit the
Crime-A Look at SEC Enforcement Remedies, Remarks to Eighteenth Annual Rocky
Mountain State-Federal-Provincial Cooperative Securities Conference (Oct. 18, 1985)
[hereinafter Cox Speech], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1985/101885cox.pdf.
15. Antoniu v. SEC, 877 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1989). For the language in context,
see id and, more fully, Cox's speech:
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proceeding. On the contrary, that statement was simply the legal effect of
the SEC's refusal to accept the NASD's petition to allow Antoniu back into
the securities industry in Antoniu L16 The meaning is clear from the use of
the past tense, "was," which referred to a concluded proceeding (Antoniu 1)
rather than a proceeding in which hearings had not yet begun (Antoniu II).
The further reference to a bar from "a" broker-dealer (the result of
Antoniu 1), as opposed to "any" broker-dealer (the question still to be
decided in Antoniu I1), should also have been clear to the court.
In most such proceedings, which involve a bar from participation in an
industry regulated by the Commission, counsel for the respondent asks for
permission to reapply for association with a broker-dealer after a certain
period of time. Denial of leave to reapply might be interpreted as making a
bar "permanent," but in reality, of course, an individual would be free to
ask for leave to reapply the next day.17  Indeed, one of Commissioner
Cox's points in his speech was that there should be, in his opinion, a more
substantial time-out from the industry for violators than had been
previously considered customary. 18
One issue that frequently arises with respect to individuals whom I call "indifferent
violators" is the length of time that a Commission remedy should remain in
effect.... In First Jersey, for example, the special examiner was to make one report
within ninety days, although the injunction is permanent. In the case of Mr. Antoniu,
his bar from association with a broker-dealer was made permanent.
Cox Speech, supra note 14, at 5 (citing SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., Litigation Release No.
10,616, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,848, at 90,231 (Nov.
26, 1984)).
16. See Notice by the Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-
22383, 33 SEC Docket 1318, 1319 (Sept. 3, 1985) (directing the NASD to bar Adrian
Antoniu from becoming associated with a member firm).
17. See Jeffrey B. Maletta & Neil S. Lang, Sanctions and Collateral Consequences, in
THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 131, 158-59 (Richard M. Phillips ed., 1997).
[T]he Commission often bars an individual permanently with a right to reapply after
stated periods of time .... Although a so-called permanent bar with no stated time
period is generally regarded as harsher than one which specifies a right to reapply
after expiration of a stated time period, theoretically, a barred person can apply for
reinstatement at any time.
Id. (citation omitted); see also SEC Rule of Practice 193(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 201.193(a)(2)
(2008) (allowing application for consent to associate where initial bar "contains a proviso
that application may be made to the Commission after a specified period of time.").
18. The relevant language from the speech is as follows:
My experience indicates that the word "permanent" may not always mean what it
says. It is apparently accepted wisdom that inside every permanent SEC order or
injunction-despite its broad, unwavering terms-is a temporary one struggling to
get out....
.... The Commission is aware that its remedies may impose restraints for what
appears to be a very long time. If an individual or firm petitions for relief based not
on changed circumstances but on a general belief in the clemency or forgetfulness of
the Commissioners and staff, I believe this is a prime indicator that we have an
"indifferent violator" on our hands, and that modification of the remedy is not
warranted.
Cox Speech, supra note 14, at 5-6.
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Professor Richard Pierce, in a thoughtful article discussing this case,19
affirmed the general leniency that courts should afford agency members in
their policy statements.2°  Nonetheless, he found the reference in
Commissioner Cox's speech "ambiguous," asking rhetorically "[w]as
Commissioner Cox's reference to Antoniu an expression of his policy
preference that all intentional violators be permanently barred, or was it
instead an indication that he had already resolved the contested issues of
adjudicative fact necessary to determine an appropriate individualized
sanction for Antoniu?" 21  With all due respect to Professor Pierce's
question, I believe the answer is clear: It was a policy judgment based on
the illustrative facts of Antoniu I, and the speech was intended to serve
important policy purposes.
22
The statements in Commissioner Cox's speech about Antoniu's case
were precisely the kind of policy judgments-as opposed to "adjudicative
facts"-that agency members are entitled to make.23 The adjudicative facts
in Antoniu II were (1) the existence of Antoniu's prior criminal conviction
(a fact already on record) and (2) whether it would be "in the public
interest" to bar Antoniu from association with any registered broker
dealer.24 Contrary to how the language of the speech has been interpreted,
19. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency
Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481 (1990).
20. Indeed, Professor Pierce suggests that the lower courts may be out of touch with
the Supreme Court cases. See id. at 494 ("I suspect. . . that the Supreme Court would be
more tolerant of outspoken agency decisionmakers than were the judges in Cinderella and
Antoniu.... It is unrealistic to expect either [FTC Chairman Dixon or Commissioner Cox]
not to have developed opinions on the case prior to formal action as decisionmaker.").
21. Id. at 494-95.
22. I believe that Professor Pierce answered this question even before he asked it.
The references to specific cases were intended only to illustrate the kind of policies
the decisionmaker preferred. As all teachers know, examples help students put meat
on the bones of abstractly expressed rules or policies. Moreover, the purpose of the
speeches in each case was to further another important goal of the administrative
state-that of helping regulatees understand the agency's policies so that they can
shape their conduct accordingly.
See id. at 494.
23. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 346 nn.9-10 (3d ed. 1991) (citing
NLRB v. Honaker Mills, 789 F.2d 262 (4th Cir. 1986); Samuel v. Bd. of Chiropractic
Exam'rs, 712 P.2d 132 (Or. App. 1985); In re Rollins Envtl. Servs., 481 So. 2d 113 (La.
1985); New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Employees v. Pub.
Employment Relations Bd., 629 F. Supp. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1984)).
Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what, where, when, how,
why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the kind of facts that
go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually concern the immediate
parties but are the general facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and
policy and discretion.
Pierce, supra note 19, at 482 n.6 (quoting KENNETH CULTLP DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 12:3, at 413 (2d ed. 1979)).
24. See Securities Exchange Act § 15(b)(6)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6)(A) (2000)
(listing the public interest as a relevant factor in SEC deliberations on whether to grant or
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the Commission made no judgment about the "public interest" in the
Antoniu II proceeding. Indeed, Commissioner Aulana L. Peters restated the
policy judgments made in Commissioner Cox's speech when she spoke to
the very same group two years later, which was before the Commission
heard the Antoniu II appeal.25 And in any event, Commissioner Cox abided
by the requirements of the prejudgment doctrine and, in an abundance of
caution, recused himself from the Antoniu I proceeding, except for
entertaining an offer of settlement as discussed next.
III. THE OFFER OF SETTLEMENT
The Antoniu II proceeding was conducted before an SEC administrative
law judge pursuant to delegated authority.26 The Division of Enforcement,
which prosecuted the administrative proceeding, brought Antoniu's offer of
settlement to the Commission. The Commission routinely considers such
offers in the midst of an administrative proceeding. The Commission
concurred with the staff's recommendation to reject Antoniu's offer.27
Offers of settlement place any agency (and any member of any agency)
in a difficult situation. Rejecting an offer of settlement might be construed
as prejudgment of the merits of a case that the agency might later be called
to adjudicate. This effect occurs regardless of any speeches anyone might
have made. 28  However, the law in this area is relatively clear: such
combination of functions does not offend the Constitution.
It is.. . very typical for the members of administrative agencies to receive
the results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal
complaints instituting enforcement proceedings, and then to participate in the
ensuing hearings. This mode of procedure does not violate the
Administrative Procedure Act, and it does not violate due process of law.
29
deny applications for association with a broker or dealer). Professor Pierce questions the
need for any hearing in such cases, where the predicate facts for the agency's actions have
been established as a matter of law. Pierce, supra note 19, at 494. However, Congress's
direction to consider the "public interest" in such proceedings makes clear, in my opinion,
the need for a further hearing on contumacy or responsibility of the respondent apart from
the predicate proceeding.
25. See Aulana L. Peters, Comm'r, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Remarks to the Twentieth
Annual Rocky Mountain State-Federal-Provincial Securities Conference 1 (Oct. 16, 1987),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1987/101687peters.pdf ("In Commissioner
Cox'[s] two appearances at this conference, he addressed the question of what remedies
were available to the Commission to deal with securities laws violators. In 1985, Charles
suggested that the Commission should be prosecuting vigorously unlawful conduct by
'indifferent' and 'chronic' violators. I wholeheartedly agree." (citation omitted)).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 200.30-9 to -10 (2008).
27. See Proffer of Evidence, supra note 5, at 3 (rejecting Antoniu's offer of settlement).
28. Antoniu, indeed, made such a motion to disqualify not only Commissioner Cox,
but the Chairman and all the other Commissioners based on this theory; this motion was
rejected. See Antoniu v. SEC, 877 F.2d 721, 723-24 (8th Cir. 1989).
29. Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting
[61:1
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Furthermore, respondents in administrative proceedings who wish to
make offers of settlement to the Commission are routinely required to
execute waivers of prejudgment claims.30 This waiver is now part of the
Commission's Rules of Practice.3 '
IV. PROCEEDINGS BY DELEGATED AUTHORITY: RECUSAL
FROM WHAT EXACTLY?
The administrative law judge ultimately ruled against Antoniu on the
merits of his case in Antoniu II. There were then two other actions taken in
the case: a grant of Antoniu's appeal of this decision to the full
Commission and a grant of additional time for the Division of Enforcement
to file a reply brief. Both of those decisions were made by delegated
authority and never reached the Commission.32 The proceeding never
again appeared before the Commission until the oral argument of Antoniu's
appeal. Commissioner Cox recused himself as soon as anyone was aware
that Antoniu's case was again before the full Commission.
The Eighth Circuit's conclusion that Commissioner Cox "refused to
recuse himself' and "continued to participate in the . .. proceedings ' '33 was
based on the absence of a formal record of any proceeding before the
Commission at which any Commissioner could have noted his or her
recusal "on the record." It is difficult to recuse oneself from a nonexistent
proceeding.34 Perhaps this is one lesson from the case for agency lawyers.
Commissioner Cox did recuse himself from oral argument and any
deliberation on the merits of Antoniu's appeal. This is clear in the record,3 5
but the Eighth Circuit incorrectly characterized his recusal as coming
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 56 (1975) (emphasis added)). In Blinder, which was
decided shortly before the Eighth Circuit's decision in Antoniu, the court refused the
defendant's petition to disqualify SEC Commissioners from an administrative proceeding
who had participated in prior litigation against him. See Blinder, 837 F.2d at 1104-05
(noting an Administrative Procedure Act exemption for agency members, e.g.,
Commissioners, from the prohibition against agency staff combining prosecutorial and
adjudicative functions in the same case).
30. No such waiver was ever mentioned in this case by the Commission or the court.
31. 17 C.F.R. § 201.240(c)(5) (2008).
32. See id. § 200.30-14(g)(1)(v) (2008) (noting that a decision to grant a petition for
review can be delegated); id. § 200.30-5(a)(4)(i) (explaining that the decision to grant
extensions to file a brief can be delegated); see also Proffer of Evidence, supra note 5, at
Ex. 1, 6-7 (noting the two actions taken by delegated authority).
33. Antoniu v. SEC, 877 F.2d at 723.
34. See Proffer of Evidence, supra note 5, at 2 ("There is no 'document of recusal' in
the administrative record, nor does one exist in other files.").
35. The Commission noted in its opinion in the Antoniu H proceeding that "[wie need
not reach Antoniu's argument that Commissioner Cox is additionally disqualified because
he referred to Antoniu in a speech. Commissioner Cox has recused himself from all




"finally ... the day the. . . opinion of the Commission was handed
down., 36 It is unfortunate that the court chose to speak on this point as an
advocate instead of a finder of facts. There are no facts to support the
court's conclusion that Commissioner Cox "continued to participate" in the
proceedings; rather, the facts indicate that Commissioner Cox abided, in an
abundance of caution, by the well-understood agency prejudgment
principles. The court's characterization of his conduct as somehow behind
the scenes and nefarious cannot not be drawn from the record37 and reflects
a lack of understanding about how administrative agencies operate.
The SEC has, to my knowledge, always scrupulously attended to all
these well-known rules and has erred, if at all, on the side of insulating the
Commissioners from the staff, which has sometimes resulted in the
Commissioners' having to make decisions "alone at the top" in
administrative proceedings. The Commission can be left unable to consult
with any members of its staff, other than those dedicated to the
consideration of appeals and agency opinions (presumably this is the case
in most agencies). In my experience, the Commissioners and staff of the
SEC are, were, and always have been scrupulously fair and honest in
avoiding the appearance of prejudgment.
It is possible, however, that some sort of institutional bias in favor of the
Commission's legislative and administrative efforts may color its judicial
determinations. Former SEC Commissioner Edward H. Fleischman
offered an assessment of the mix:
My experience suggests that consistency in SEC quasi-executive and quasi-
legislative policymaking has assumed an increasingly self-generative and
self-vindicative character, demanding the ratification afforded by the quasi-
judicial process with its appearance of disinterestedness. Ultimately, in my
view, the more consistency the SEC as a body achieves in application of
administrative policies, the more committed the SEC as a body becomes to
vindication, in whatever capacity it is acting, of the policies thus consistently
applied.38
Perhaps this is true, but in this instance Commissioner Cox exercised the
well-intentioned judgment to not participate in the judicial "vindication" of
the policies he endorsed. That the record failed to reflect this judgment and
that a court was therefore able to entertain a wildly fanciful explanation of
what might have happened is, in my opinion, most unfortunate.
36. Antoniu v. SEC, 877 F.2d at 723.
37. The sentence of the opinion-which is, in my opinion, the most offensive-states,
"The motion [to disqualify the entire Commission based on rejection of the offer of
settlement] was denied and specifically, Commissioner Cox refused to recuse himself." Id.
at 723 (emphasis added). This characterization is wholly unsupported and unwarranted.
38. Edward H. Fleischman, Toward Neutral Principles: The SEC's Discharge of Its




What happened after this debacle? Antoniu's case was remanded to the
Commission following denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court.3 9
Pursuant to Antoniu's offer of settlement, the Commission barred him from
the securities industry in 1992 with leave to reapply in six months.4 °
Antoniu then changed his name and turned his efforts to other venues. In
2001, he was ordered in an SEC administrative proceeding to pay a civil
fine of $100,000 and barred from association with any broker or dealer.41
In 2005, he settled a civil lawsuit in which he admitted violating the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws and agreed to pay a civil penalty
of over $400,000.42
39. Antoniu v. SEC, 877 F.2d 721, cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
40. Antoniu, Exchange Act Release No. 34-30624, 51 SEC Docket 485 (Apr. 23,
1992). With regard to the amount of time before reapplication, see supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
41. Rooney, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44414, 75 SEC Docket 415 (June 13,
2001).
42. SEC v. Alexander, Litigation Release No. 19,100 (Feb. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19100.htm.
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